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IN 'THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LOA JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff and Appella;nt, 
vs. 
ELIZABETH F. SYME, Adminis-
tratrix of the Estate of Bailey Syme, 
Deceased, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPEAL 
No. 8547 
APPELLANTS PETITION FOR REHEARING AND 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF. 
PETITION 
Comes now the plaintiff and ·appellant, Loa Johnson, 
by her counsel, and respectfully petitions the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah, to grant to the plaintiff and 
appellant a rehearing in the .above entitled cause. This 
petition is based upon the Statement of Points and Argu-
ments which follow. 
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2 
POINT I. 
THE COURT IN ITS OPINION FAILED TO CONSIDER 
THE APPELLANT'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION, VIZ. 
THAT APPELLANT'S INJURIES WERE A PROXIMATE RE-
SULT OF WILLFUL AND WANTON MISCONDUCT ON THE 
PART OF THE DECEASED. 
ARGUMENT 
In the appellant's complaint, two causes of action 
were pleaded: _The first cause of action alleged that 
her injuries were the proximate result of negligent con-
duct on the part of the deceased, Bailey Syme. The second 
cause of action alleged that the appellant was injured 
by the willful and wanton misconduct of the decedent. 
The lower court dismissed both causes of action and 
appellant raised on appeal to this court the propriety of 
both dismissals. 
This court in its "Titten opinion .and :Jir. Justice 
W ase in his dissenting opinion dealt entirely "ith the dis-
missal of the first cause of action. Both opinions ·were 
devoted solel~v to a discussion of whether the appellant 
was guilty of contributory negligence as a n1atter of lmY. 
Neither opinion considered the propriety of the lower 
con rt '~ ruling dis1nissing the second cause of action which 
wa;s botton1ed on \Yillful and wanton n1isconduct of the 
deceased. 
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3 
The grave importance of this omission is that even 
though the appellant was guilty of contributory negli-
gence' as a matter of law (as a majority of the court con-
cluded) her negligence in no way bar.s her recovery for 
injuries inflicted by the willful and wanton misconduct of 
the deceased. Jensen vs. D. & R. G. Ry. Co., 44 Utah 100, 
111, 138 Pac. 1185, citing 2 Cooley on Torts, 3rd Ed., pg. 
1442. 
In his treatise on the Law of Torts, Sec. 151, pg. 
324, Professor Harper points out that ''willful and 
wanton" misconduct or "reckless and wanton" miscon-
duct consist of acts or omissions which involve a higher 
degree of culpability than acts which are merely negli-
gent. He states: 
"Such conduct differs from wilful harm in 
that defendant does not act for the purpose of 
harming the plaintiff; it differs from negligence 
in that the actor knows and is full conscious that 
his conduct involves .a grave risk to others 
whereas in merely negligent conduct, it may be 
that the actor does not realize the danger to others 
but, as a reasonable man, should recognize the 
nature and extent of the risk." 
Harper quotes approvingly from Atchison, T. etc. 
R. Co. vs. Baker, 79 Kans. 183, 98 Pac. 804, 21 L.R.A. 
(N. S.) 427, wherein the court stated: 
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"One who is properly charged with reckless-
ness or wantonness is not simply more careless 
than one who is guilty of negligence; his conduct 
must be such as to put him in the class with the 
wilful doer of wrong. The only respect in which 
his attitude is less blameworthy than that of the 
intentional wrongdoer is that instead of affirma-
tively wishing to injure ~another, he is merely 
willing to do so. The difference is that between 
him who casts a missile intending that it shall 
strike another, and him who casts it where he has 
reason to believe it will strike another, being in-
different whether it does or not." 
Harper further points out that by the rule estab-
lished in a number of states .a defendant may be guilty 
of "reckless and wanton" misconduct e1;en though he did 
not know of the plaintiff's presence, if the probability 
of his presence was very high and the defendant's activity 
was dangerous. 
"The fundamental characteristic of reckless 
misconduct is that it usually indicates an indiffer-
ence on the part of a person to the safety of others 
and such indifference may be shown, it would 
seem, in cases where the actual presence of the 
other is not known, if the chances of his presence 
and the gravity of his peril, if present. are suf-
ficiently great to establish a consciousness on the 
part of the defendant that he is creating an un-
reasonable risk." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
Applying Profe.ssor Harper's definition and ex-
amples to the instant caHe, it is clear that there is evi-
dence of "willful and wanton" misconduct on the part 
of Bailey Syme, the deceased. As appe.ars in the st~ate­
ment of facts in the opinion of this court, he drove along 
a courrtry road at a speed of 40 m.p.h., past a stop sign 
and thence onto a bu.sy four lane transcontinental high-
way where automobiles were tr.aveling at or about the 
speed limit of 50 m.p.h. Whether he failed to see the 
stop sign or whether he saw it and disregarded it is not 
known, and makes no difference here. He at least knew 
or is chargeable with knowledge that he was approaching 
State Street, a heavily traveled thoroughfare where 
automobiles customarily travel at 50 m.p.h. Yet he drove 
onto State Street without stopping, directly into the path 
of the plaintiff. Here, in the words of Profe.ssor Harper, 
"the probability of the plaintiff's presence was very 
high and the activity of the defendant very dangerous 
to life and limb." B.ailey Syme was indifferent to the 
safety of others. While he may no)t have actually wished 
to injure anyone, he was at least willing to do so. The 
intent to injure some one is not a necessary ingredient of 
"willful misconduct." Cope vs. Davison, Cal., 180 P. 2d 
873; Tighe vs. Diamond, 149 Oh. St. 520, 80 N. E. 2d 122. 
"Willful" or "wanton" misconduct is such disregard of 
known duty necessary to the s.afe,ty of the person and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
entire absence of care for life, person or property of 
others as exhibits a consciou.s indifference to the con-
sequences, said the Illinois Court in Pittman vs. Duggan, 
336 Ill. App. 502, 84 N. E. 2d 701, 703. Certainly Bailey 
Syme in driving onto U.S. 91 without first stopping and 
waiting until the traffic cleared fits well the definition by 
the Illinois Court. His conduct was more than merely 
negligent. It was willful and wanton, and the plaintiff's 
contributory negligence in failing to see him sooner does 
not har her recovery, Jensen vs. D. & R. G Ry. Co., supra. 
The conduct of Bailey Syme in running the stop sign 
and driving onto busy State Street where a constant 
stream of automobile•s race by at 50 m.p.h. was not much 
less "willful and wanton" than had he fired a gun into a 
crowd of people. 
Had the plaintiff been a guest in the automobil~ 
Brailey Syme and were she now bringing this action under 
our guest statute ( 41-9-1, U.C.A. 1953) where "''illful 
and wanton" misconduct is required to be shown, this 
court, we predict, would not hesitate to hold that the facts 
justified submission of the case to a jury. In fact, the 
instant ca.se is stronger on its facts than any guest case 
which has been decided by this court. The conduct of 
Bailey Syme was n1ore dangerous to life and limb than 
that of the defendant in Stack vs. J{ earns, 221 P. 2d 594, 
where he drove .around a curve at an excessive rate of 
speed while hraking at the smne tin1e. 
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7 
Further, as pointed out in appellant's original brief, 
the conduct of Bailey Syme would warrant his conviction 
of involuntary manslaughter had the plaintiff been killed 
and Syme survived. See State vs. Lingman; State vs. 
Barker; State v.s. Anderson, cited in original brief. 
CONCLUSION 
It must be remembered that this case was dismissed 
by the court at a pretrial conference. The plaintiff has 
never had "her day in court." She has never had the 
opportunity of presenting to the court and jury her 
evidence of "willful'' .and "wanton" misconduct. Clearly, 
a jury question was made out by the offer of proof made 
by the plaintiff at the pre-trial hearing. This court should 
grant a re-hearing and consider at length the plaintiff's 
second cau.se of action bottomed on willful and wanton 
misconduct. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LEE W. HOBBS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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